Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a Model with Heterogenous Firms by Davin Chor
Subsidies for FDI:







This paper develops a two-country version of the Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
model with heterogenous ¯rms to analyze the welfare e®ects of subsidy schemes to attract
multinationals. Considering policies ¯nanced by a tax on labor income, I show formally
that the use of a small cost subsidy by the host country to multinational ¯rms raises
welfare in that country. This welfare improvement stems from a selection e®ect: The
subsidy attracts the most productive home country exporters to switch to servicing the
foreign market via FDI, allowing foreign consumers to access these ¯rms' products at
a lower price by saving on cross-border transport costs. This consumption gain to the
foreign country outweighs the direct costs of funding the subsidy precisely because it is
the most productive home country exporters that respond to the FDI subsidy. Some
benchmark calibrations show that the magnitude of the welfare gains from a subsidy to
variable costs is substantially larger than from a subsidy to the ¯xed cost of conducting
FDI. Intuitively, a variable cost subsidy also helps to raise the ine±ciently low output
levels of each ¯rm stemming from their mark-up pricing power.
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11 Introduction
This paper presents an application of the trade models with heterogenous ¯rms advanced by
Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) to an analysis of policy interventions
related to foreign direct investment (FDI). It examines speci¯cally the use of cost subsidies
to attract multinational corporations (MNCs), which have become an increasingly popular
practice among prospective host countries. Importantly, the modelling framework allows us
to undertake a positive analysis of the welfare implications for countries that extend such
incentives to attract MNCs, to determine in particular the scope for a welfare improvement
from subsidizing FDI.
As an economic phenomenon, FDI has expanded considerably over the past two decades.1
Many countries, including many in the developing world, are in fact now keen to attract FDI
to their shores for a variety of reasons. The potential consumption gains are perhaps the most
direct e®ect, since the relocation of production lowers the prices that multinationals charge in
their host country's market, due to the savings on cross-border transport costs and possibly
also labor costs (if the host is a developing country where labor is less expensive). In addition,
host countries often value the increased demand for labor, which bolsters local employment
and real wages, as well as the injection of foreign capital.2 The policy arguments in favor
of FDI have also stressed other perceived long-term bene¯ts for economic growth, such as
industrial spillovers and transfers of technological expertise, although such e®ects have been
more di±cult to identify empirically.3
Not surprisingly, countries that adopt these positive views towards FDI have used an
array of incentive measures to attract a larger share of the FDI pie, ranging from tax breaks
to the subsidization of construction and rent for multinationals. A recent edition of the
World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2003) surmised that \[t]he use of locational incentives
to attract FDI has considerably expanded [sic.] in frequency and value" (p. 124), resulting in
an intensifying competition among countries for FDI projects. The Report cited the example
1Of note, inward stocks of FDI into developing countries increased almost threefold as a percentage of
GDP, from 12.6% in 1980 to 36.0% in 2002 (UNCTAD 2003).
2On the positive labor market e®ects of FDI, Rama (2001) reports some suggestive evidence that PPP-
adjusted real wages are positively correlated with the FDI-to-GDP ratio across countries.
3For example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) ¯nd relatively small net e®ects of foreign investment on domestic
¯rms in Venezuela. On the other hand, a recent piece by Javorcik (2004) does ¯nd evidence among Lithua-
nian ¯rms of positive spillovers stemming from backward linkages improving the productivity levels of local
suppliers. As for the cross-country literature on the growth e®ects of FDI, Nunnenkamp's (2004) overview
of the current evidence concludes that whether these bene¯ts materialize depends crucially on host-country
conditions such as the quality of the workforce and the strength of local institutions.
2of how BMW was reportedly wooed by up to 250 European sites before ¯nally locating a
plant in Leipzig in 2001.4 There has also been brewing unease among some Western European
countries over the aggressive use of corporate tax cuts by several Central and Eastern European
countries, such as Poland and Slovakia, to attract FDI, prompting France and Germany to
propose harmonizing the basic tax rate within the European Union (The Economist, July
24th, 2004).5
Although FDI subsidies have become a common feature of the international economic
landscape, it is not clear a priori that such policies are necessarily welfare-improving for the
host country even in the absence of strategic competition for FDI. On net, the direct ¯scal
costs of ¯nancing the subsidy schemes have to be weighed against the bene¯ts of an increased
multinational presence.
To assess this tradeo® formally, I develop a two-country model that considers the interac-
tion between a Home country where multinationals are headquartered and a Foreign country
seeking to attract FDI. Firms within an industry di®er in their innate productivity levels, as
determined by a draw from a pre-existing distribution of technological possibilities. The initial
industry equilibrium sees only the most productive Home ¯rms conducting FDI in Foreign
to service that market, since ¯rms need to be su±ciently productive to compensate for the
higher ¯xed costs of operating an overseas plant. Crucially, the model I formulate admits a
closed-form expression for consumer welfare, which facilitates analysis of the impact of vari-
ous policy interventions. The key exercise I conduct examines whether a subsidy to attract
even more Home ¯rms to conduct FDI, ¯nanced by revenues from an income tax on Foreign's
workers, can in fact be welfare-improving for the host country. I focus in this analysis solely
on the consumption gains accruing to the Foreign country from attracting more MNCs, as
consumers there pay a lower price for MNC's products so long as wage costs in Foreign are
not too high. Although this puts aside other potential gains such as technological spillovers
or agglomeration e®ects, it nevertheless serves as an important benchmark, since these addi-
tional dynamic e®ects would further reinforce the bene¯ts of attracting FDI. A more salient
caveat is that this leaves out feedback e®ects that MNCs could have on domestic labor mar-
4See also Table 1 in Davies (2005) for a list of publicly-announced incentive packages extended in North
America to automobile producers between the late 1970s and the late 1990s.
5The article in The Economist reports that \Poland reduced its basic rate this year (2004) from 27% to
19%, and Slovakia from 25% to 19%. Hungary has a 16% rate, while Estonia does not even levy corporate tax
on reinvested earnings. By contrast, Germany levies a 38.3% rate ::: and France 34.3%." See Hines (1996)
and Devereux and Gri±th (1998) for empirical evidence on the importance of di®erences in corporate tax
rates in explaining cross-state or cross-country variation in volumes of multinational activity received.
3kets. Notwithstanding this, the results that I derive will still hold so long as the labor supply
in the host country is su±ciently elastic, so that wages do not rise so much in response to
the increased demand for labor that it chokes o® the original incentive for MNCs to locate
production in that country.
Previewing the main results in Section 3, I establish that a small subsidy for FDI does
indeed improve welfare in the host country. This result holds both for a subsidy that reduces
MNCs' ¯xed costs of operation (such as through the construction of industrial parks and
infrastructure) and when the subsidy is applied to their variable costs of production (such as
via job-creation subsidies or corporate tax cuts). Importantly, this welfare improvement is
driven by a selection e®ect that arises when ¯rms are heterogenous in their productivity levels:
The subsidy allows the host country to attract the most productive Home ¯rms that were
previously servicing Foreign via exports rather than via horizontal FDI. When the distribution
of ¯rm productivities is su±ciently thick-tailed { a condition found to be satis¯ed empirically
by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) { this selection e®ect allows the host country to generate
consumption gains that are larger than the direct costs of ¯nancing the subsidy. The key role
played by ¯rm heterogeneity for this result is made clear in Section 3.3, which contrasts how
the scope for a welfare improvement from a subsidy is theoretically ambiguous when all ¯rms
have identical productivity levels as in the antecedent model of Krugman (1980).
Apart from the selection e®ect highlighted above, there is an additional varieties e®ect that
emerges when we take into account how the subsidy scheme raises the ex ante pro¯tability
of potential entrant ¯rms to the Home industry. Section 3.4 shows how this increases the
measure of Home ¯rms in the full industry equilibrium, and ampli¯es the consumption gains
to Foreign.
Are there any substantive di®erences then between the use of ¯xed versus variable cost
subsidies? A simple calibration exercise (Section 3.5) shows that variable cost subsidies have
a quantitatively much larger impact on aggregate Foreign welfare than ¯xed cost subsidies.
Intuitively, a variable cost subsidy alters both the entry and production margins for Home
MNCs, whereas a ¯xed cost subsidy a®ects only the former. The decline in variable costs raises
output levels at each ¯rm, which delivers an additional kick to consumption and counteracts
some of the ine±ciency arising from each ¯rms' monopoly pricing power. However, this
favorable comparison of variable cost over ¯xed cost subsidies warrants some quali¯cation. If
the production facility in Foreign also serves as a platform to service third-country markets (as
in Grossman et al. (2006)), then not all the consumption gains from the FDI subsidy accrue
4to the domestic economy. When this re-export motive for FDI is large, a variable cost scheme
that commits to subsidizing each unit of production can raise the subsidy bill substantially,
potentially even lowering Foreign's welfare, unless the subsidy takes the form of a sales credit
or rebate to domestic consumption as opposed to a direct subsidy to production costs. A ¯xed
cost subsidy, on the other hand, would be immune to this criticism, since it a®ects only the
entry decision of MNCs.
This paper contributes to an extensive literature on the e®ects of subsidies and competition
for FDI, but several features set it apart from the existing work. In particular, it presents a
¯rst attempt to the best of my knowledge to apply a framework with heterogenous ¯rms to
these policy issues. The paper also falls within a growing body of research (exempli¯ed by
Baldwin et al. (2003)), that takes an explicit industry equilibrium approach towards analyzing
the e®ects of trade policy interventions.6 In this paper, the incorporation of ¯rm heterogeneity
enables us to be very precise in describing the industry equilibrium, speci¯cally how each ¯rm's
productivity level and the size of the FDI subsidy pins down its location decision and mode
for servicing the Foreign market (via exports or FDI).
Separately, this paper also speaks to a broader literature on optimal policy towards foreign
investment. The early theoretical contributions on this topic, by MacDougall (1960), Kemp
(1966) and Jones (1967), found that with cross-country specialization in production, the
optimal policy for a country acting unilaterally requires taxing both imports and capital
in°ows. Intuitively, without a tax on capital °ows, the use of an optimal tari® could prompt
more tari®-jumping foreign investment, which could ultimately erode the gains from the tari®
on imports. However, this strand of work views foreign investment as international °ows of
capital, in contrast to the more recent literature on MNCs which treats FDI more concretely as
the production activities of overseas a±liates. Along these lines, there has been work exploring
various economic settings under which FDI subsidies might generate welfare improvements.
For example, Haaland and Wooten (1999) examine how FDI subsidies can foster agglomeration
e®ects, while Pennings (2005) shows that a positive subsidy is indeed optimal when foreign
investors face some uncertainty over demand conditions in the host economy.7 Other authors
6For example, Hau°er and Wooten (1999) and Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) consider the advantage
that market size can confer on countries in the competition to attract ¯rms or mobile capital in a general
equilibrium model.
7Janeba (2002) models this uncertainty as arising from an inability by the host government to make credible
long-term commitments to maintain their announced tax or subsidy policies. His analysis also takes into full
account that there are two dimensions to this credibility issue, namely that MNCs themselves may not be able
to credibly commit to invest in only one country.
5have argued that FDI subsidies can serve to counteract either a pre-existing distortion in the
economy (Black and Hoyt 1989) or improve the allocation of ¯rms' production facilities to
countries from the standpoint of aggregate e±ciency (Fumagalli 2003).8 In this paper, the
welfare improvement stems instead from the reduction of barriers to entry (the high ¯xed
costs of conducting FDI) for the most productive Home ¯rms that would otherwise service
the Foreign market by exporting without the FDI subsidy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the building blocks of the
model. Section 3 establishes the main propositions concerning the scope for a welfare im-
provement from either a ¯xed or variable cost subsidy to FDI. Section 4 brie°y explores some
extensions. A parallel analysis shows that there is a similar scope for improving welfare in
the foreign country through an import subsidy (Section 4.1). I also show that my results are
robust to the use of an alternative functional form for utility that allows for income e®ects,
wherein the reduction in disposable income in Foreign caused by the labor tax dampens con-
sumer demand and thus potentially reduces utility levels (Section 4.2). Section 5 concludes.
Detailed proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model Set-up
We proceed in steps to introduce the various building blocks of the model. There are two
countries in the baseline model, called Home and Foreign, indexed by H and F respectively.
Each economy is made up of two sectors: (i) a homogenous good sector, and (ii) a (country-
speci¯c) di®erentiated goods sector. Labor is the sole factor of production.













i denotes consumption of homogenous goods, which we treat as our numeraire. Xc
i
is the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of consumption over products, xc
















8Speci¯cally, Black and Hoyt (1989) consider how a subsidy to ¯rms may reduce the distortion caused by
the average cost pricing of public services, when the marginal cost of providing these services is less than the
tax revenue that they generate. In the case of Fumagalli (2003), ¯rms prefer to be located in a region that
is a more developed market, but locating the MNC in a less developed region may yield greater gains from
technological spillovers.
6where ­c
i is the set of products from country c available to consumers in country i; for example,
when c = H and i = F, this set is the union of goods imported from Home and those
produced in Foreign by Home MNCs. I shall assume that 0 < ¹ < ® < 1. This means that
the di®erentiated goods are pair-wise substitutes, and moreover, that products from the same
country are closer substitutes than products from di®erent countries.
Di®erentiated products are indexed by a, which is the amount of labor required to produce
one unit of the good. 1=a is thus a measure of a ¯rm's labor productivity. Each ¯rm draws
its a upon paying the ¯xed cost of entry into the industry from an exogenous technological
distribution Gc(a), and so the resulting productivity di®erences are the key dimension along
which ¯rms in the di®erentiated goods sector are heterogeneous.














c(a) = wi (2.3)
where wi is the wage income of a representative consumer in country i, and pc
i is the unit
price of good xc
i. (The homogenous good price is normalized to 1.) This utility speci¯cation
generates a demand function for each product with constant elasticity, " = 1






i(a)¡". Substituting this into the de¯nition in (2.2) yields the following
expression for Xc

















Intuitively, the CES aggregator for consumption decreases as individual goods prices rise.9
Welfare measure: As a measure of welfare for the subsequent analysis, I also derive
the indirect utility function, Wi, for a representative consumer. The demand function for
di®erentiated products, xc
i(a), and the budget constraint (2.3) together imply a level of demand
for the homogenous good, x0
i. Substituting this expression for x0
i into the utility function (2.1)
and simplifying, one obtains:










The analysis which follows focuses on the industry equilibrium for the Home di®erentiated
goods sector, namely c = H, and the e®ects of a Foreign subsidy on FDI from this sector. For
brevity, I suppress the c superscript throughout unless there is cause for ambiguity.
9An alternative way to see this is to realize that Xc
i is equal to the ideal price index for Home goods raised
to the power of ¡1=(1 ¡ ¹).
7Nominal wages: The homogenous good is produced under a constant returns to scale
technology. I assume that the labor force in each country is su±ciently large, so that output
in this numeraire sector is strictly positive in equilibrium. The nominal wage in each economy
is then pinned down by the marginal product of labor in this sector, which facilitates a closed-
form solution. A more general model would allow for the wage in the host country to rise
in response to the increased demand for Foreign labor, but this would intuitively deliver a
positive income e®ect and raise welfare in Foreign. The results derived below would continue
to hold, so long as the Foreign labor market is su±ciently °exible (labor supply there is
su±ciently elastic), so that the rise in wF is not so large that it erodes the incentives for
MNCs to locate production in Foreign.10
Production and pro¯ts: The structure of production in the di®erentiated goods sector
follows closely that in Melitz, Helpman and Yeaple (2004). Upon entering the industry, each
Home ¯rm takes a productivity draw, a, from the distribution GH(a). Production for the
Home domestic economy requires a ¯xed cost of fD units of labor in each period, while the
marginal cost of each unit of output is awH. Since ¯rms are pro¯t maximizing, they set prices
equal to a constant mark-up, 1
®, over marginal costs.
Home ¯rms may service the Foreign market through one of two means, namely exporting
or horizontal FDI. Firms that export incur two additional costs: (i) a per-period ¯xed cost of
exporting, equal to fX units of Home labor; and (ii) the conventional iceberg transport costs,
which raise unit production costs by a factor ¿ > 1. (For simplicity, the homogenous good is
assumed to be costlessly transportable.) On the other hand, Home ¯rms which are su±ciently
productive may opt to start up an additional manufacturing plant in Foreign, in order to save
on transport costs. However, FDI requires a higher per-period ¯xed cost, fI > fX, than
exporting.
Denote the number of workers in country i by Mi (i = H;F). For the Home ¯rm with
productivity level 1=a, the per-period pro¯ts from production for the domestic economy, from
exporting, and from FDI in Foreign are given respectively by ¼D(a), ¼X(a) and ¼I(a):
10More generally, one can endogenize the nominal wage by removing this outside sector from the model,
but the resulting expression for wF is the root of a non-linear polynomial. A full solution would require the




























where Ai = Mi(Xi)
¹¡®
1¡® (i = H;F) is the level of demand in country i. Since there is a
continuum of ¯rms, individual ¯rms take these levels of demand as given.11
Productivity cut-o®s: Firms engage in production for the domestic market if pro¯ts
from (2.6) are positive. Solving ¼D(a) = 0, this establishes a cut-o® value, aD, which is the
maximum labor input coe±cient at which production for the Home market is pro¯table. In
addition, ¯rms for which ¼X(a) ¸ 0 export to Foreign. This implies a cut-o® value, aX, such
that exporting is pro¯table for all ¯rms with a < aX. However, Home ¯rms service the Foreign
market via FDI instead if ¼I(a) > ¼X(a); solving for the value of a that equates (2.7) and
(2.8) yields a third cut-o®, aI, such that the Home ¯rm opts for FDI over exporting if a < aI.












(1 ¡ ®)AF[(wF=®)1¡" ¡ (¿wH=®)1¡"]
(2.11)
Following Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), I introduce several restrictions on parameter
values that ensure a natural sorting pattern of ¯rms to the various modes of servicing the two
markets. In particular, I require aD > aX > aI, so that only the most productive ¯rms
(a > aI) are able to conduct FDI, while ¯rms with an intermediate level of productivity
(aX > a > aI) export to Foreign. Firms with aD > a > aX serve only the Home market, while
¯rms that draw an a larger than aD have labor input requirements that are too high and thus





aX > aI , fI > (
¿wH
wF )"¡1fX. The ¯xed cost of exporting (normalized by the level of Foreign
11Due to the additive separability of the utility derived from Home and Foreign goods in (2.1), actions taken
by ¯rms in the Foreign di®erentiated goods sector do not a®ect the demand functions and hence pro¯t levels
of Home ¯rms. See Levy and Nolan (1992) for an analysis of FDI policy when domestic ¯rms and MNCs are
oligopolistic competitors in the same market. In their context, the net e®ect on welfare depends on how the
gains from having the potentially more productive MNC supply the domestic market are weighed against the
negative impact on the production levels of domestic ¯rms.
9demand) must be su±ciently larger than the ¯xed cost of domestic production, so that only
su±ciently productive ¯rms are able to overcome the higher ¯xed cost barrier to exporting.12
Similarly, the ¯xed cost of FDI must be large enough relative to that for exporting, so that
FDI is more pro¯table only for the most productive Home ¯rms. Figure 1 illustrates this
sorting pattern of ¯rms according to a1¡", which proxies for ¯rms' productivity levels (since
1¡" < 0). Finally, (2.11) requires that wF < ¿wH, in order that aI > 0. Thus, Foreign wages
are lower than the marginal cost of the exporting option, in order to make horizontal FDI a
pro¯table operation for some positive productivity levels.
Technology: The distribution, GH(a), of productivity draws, 1=a, is parameterized by
a Pareto distribution with shape parameter k, as is common in the industrial organization
literature. Here, a higher k corresponds to a thicker right-tail in the distribution of produc-
tivity levels. It is convenient to de¯ne V H(a) =
R a
0 ~ a1¡"dGH(~ a), as this expression will show
up repeatedly. The Pareto distribution facilitates an analytical solution, since GH and V H


















Note that a < aH, with 1=aH being a lower bound on Home productivity levels.
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that if the underlying productivity distribution
is Pareto with shape parameter k, then the distribution of observed ¯rm sales will be Pareto
with shape k ¡ " + 1. In fact, this distribution is equal to V H(a) up to a multiplicative
constant. Their estimation based on European ¯rm-level data establishes the goodness of ¯t
of this parametric distribution for ¯rm sales, while yielding estimates for k ¡ " + 1 that are
always signi¯cantly greater than 0 across manufacturing industries. This empirical evidence
motivates a key assumption: k > " ¡ 1. In essence, this is a condition on the extent of ¯rm
heterogeneity in the Home sector, namely that the distribution of Home ¯rm productivities
is su±ciently thick-tailed, placing a su±ciently large mass on high productivity levels.
Equilibrium consumption of di®erentiated goods: We can now solve for the equilib-
rium level of XH and XF, namely the CES consumption aggregates for Home's di®erentiated
12To be fully precise, one needs to take the expressions for AH and AF that are solved for in general equi-
librium and substitute them into this inequality for the full condition based only on the structural parameters
of the model.
10goods sector in the Home and Foreign markets respectively. In particular, these will be key
expressions for evaluating welfare based on the indirect utility function, (2.5). From (2.4) and






























































where N is the measure of Home ¯rms. Note that I have substituted the expressions for the
productivity cut-o®s from (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11), as well as for the Pareto distribution from
(2.12) to evaluate the integrals above. The terms ¤H and ¤F are given explicitly by:
¤H =
" ¡ 1




































Note that ¤H and ¤F are equal to the ex ante pro¯t levels that a prospective entrant ¯rm
in the Home sector would obtain in expectation (ie before observing its productivity draw a)
from sales in Home and Foreign respectively, if the market demand levels AH and AF were
normalized to 1. I therefore refer intuitively to ¤H and ¤F as the normalized pro¯t levels in
these respective markets.
Recall though that Ai = Mi(Xi)
¹¡®
1¡® (for i = H;F), which is a de¯nition I now substitute











~ ¤i; i = H;F (2.18)
where ~ ¤i = (¤i)
¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®) and ~ Mi = (Mi)
k®(1¡¹)
¹®¡k(¹¡®). (2.18) is a very useful expression for
computing country welfare levels; in particular, observe from (2.5) that (XF)¹ is proportional
to the quantum of utility derived by Foreign from the consumption of Home di®erentiated
goods. Note that (XF)¹ and hence Foreign welfare is increasing in N, the measure of Home
¯rms, so that there is the usual \love of varieties" e®ect. In addition, (XF)¹ rises with ¤F
(since
¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®) > 0 as ¹ < ®); a higher normalized pro¯t level of Home ¯rms from sales
11in Foreign implies that Foreign consumers have access to goods from more Home ¯rms, thus
raising the level of welfare in Foreign. Finally, we have a market size e®ect, whereby (XF)¹
increases with MF (since
k®(1¡¹)
¹®¡k(¹¡®) ¡ 1 =
¹(k¡k®¡®)
¹®¡k(¹¡®) > 0 , k > ®
1¡® = " ¡ 1, which holds by
the assumption on the extent of ¯rm heterogeneity).13
To close the model fully, one needs to pin down the measure of Home ¯rms, N, with a
free-entry condition for the Home sector. However, I defer this discussion to Section 3.4, since
(2.18) already facilitates a closed-form expression for Foreign welfare that corresponds loosely
to the case of a \small" Foreign country, namely when the foreign country is too small to
a®ect the entry decisions of prospective entrant ¯rms in Home. Analyzing this case where
N is exogenous helps to isolate and highlight the selection e®ect of FDI subsidies, inducing
existing Home ¯rms to switch their mode of servicing Foreign from exporting to FDI. It will
turn out later in the endogenous N case that the additional entry or varieties e®ect works
to reinforce this selection e®ect, so that the welfare implications are qualitatively identical. I
therefore turn ¯rst to the policy analysis of the exogenous N case.
3 The Welfare Implications of FDI Subsidies
We now consider the e®ects of FDI subsidies to attract more Home ¯rms to locate in Foreign,
focusing on ¯rm location decisions and the welfare implications for the host economy. I
¯rst establish that the use of a small subsidy increases welfare levels both when the subsidy
is applied to the ¯xed costs of FDI (Section 3.1) or to the variable component of MNCs'
production costs (Section 3.2). Section 3.3 highlights the key role played by ¯rm heterogeneity
in the analysis, by contrasting the results against a model where all ¯rms have identical
productivity levels. As promised, Section 3.4 shows how to endogenize N for the full industry
equilibrium, a step that leaves the welfare implications unchanged. Section 3.5 provides a
discussion on the relative e±cacy of ¯xed versus variable cost subsidies.
3.1 FDI subsidy to ¯xed costs
Consider ¯rst the use of a subsidy by the Foreign government that reduces the per-period
¯xed costs of FDI for Home multinationals by the amount: sf(fI ¡fX)wH, where sf < 1. For
13It is important for the derivation of the neat closed-forms in (2.14), (2.15) and (2.18) that fD and fX both
be strictly larger than zero. For instance, if fX = 0, then the expression for the cut-o® aD would involve both
AH and AF, since all ¯rms that engage in domestic production also export when the ¯xed cost of exporting
is 0. AH (in addition to AF) would then enter on the right-hand side of (2.15) when computing that CES
consumption aggregate, and it would in general not be possible to isolate a closed-form for XF or AF.
12example, this subsidy could come in the form of the provision of basic infrastructure such as
roads or communications networks, which the MNC would otherwise have to pay for on its
own. Alternatively, the subsidies could remove certain lump-sum regulatory fees that need to
be paid on a recurrent basis. Note that the subsidy is applied to the di®erence between the
¯xed costs of investment and exporting, to capture how it closes the gap between the upfront
costs of these two modes of servicing the Foreign market. (The proposition below on the scope
for a welfare improvement still holds if the subsidy is applied to fI instead of fI ¡ fX, with
the proofs being entirely analogous.)
Throughout the analysis, I restrict myself to subsidy policies that are \budget-neutral",
in that the subsidy bill is exactly paid for by revenues raised from a tax on Foreign labor
income. In the case of a ¯xed cost subsidy, the income tax rate, tf, must therefore satisfy the
following equation to balance Foreign's state budget:
tfwFMF = sf(fI ¡ fX)wHNG
H(aI) (3.1)
The expression on the right-hand-side of this balanced-budget constraint is the total ¯scal bill
from subsidizing each Home ¯rm with a < aI by the amount sf(fI ¡ fX)wH. Firms continue
to pay wF for each unit of Foreign labor they employ, but Foreign workers now maximize
utility subject to the budget constraint (2.3) with wF replaced by (1¡tf)wF. Note that tf is
thus the minimum tax rate that needs to be levied on consumers in order to cover the costs
of funding the subsidy to MNCs.
To evaluate the net impact on welfare, it su±ces to examine what happens to the terms,
WFf ´ (1 ¡ tf)wF +
1¡¹
¹ (XF)¹, in the formula for indirect utility in (2.5).14 This expres-
sion for WFf illustrates the nature of the tradeo® facing Foreign: The FDI subsidy lowers
the productivity cut-o®, a
1¡"
I , allowing some Home ¯rms that were previously exporting to
turn to FDI as their mode of servicing Foreign. There is thus a margin of goods that were
previously exported to Foreign at price
¿awH
® that are now priced more cheaply at
awF
® by the
MNC's Foreign facility (by assumption, ¿wH > wF). While this boosts the CES consumption
aggregate X
¹
F, the consumption gain must be weighed against the direct cost of the income
tax, ¡tfwF.
The following proposition formally establishes that the net e®ect is a welfare improvement
from a \small" positive subsidy to the ¯xed costs of FDI:
14This follows from the additively separable nature of utility obtained from consuming di®erentiated prod-
ucts from each country, c = H;F.
13Proposition 1 [Fixed Cost Subsidy]: Consider the family of ¯xed cost FDI subsidies
characterized by sf that satisfy the balanced-budget constraint (3.1). Then the optimal policy,
s¤
f, that maximizes welfare in Foreign is a strictly positive subsidy level, namely s¤
f 2 (0;1).
Proof: Using (2.11), (2.12) and (3.1), one can express tf in terms of sf and the underlying
model parameters. Together with the expression for (XF)¹ from (2.18), this yields:









































(Note that the expression
@¤Ff
@sf appears in (3.2) via an algebraic substitution; no ¯rst-order
conditions have been taken yet.)




























´ k(¹ ¡ ®)

















The terms outside the square brackets in (3.3) are clearly positive (in particular, ~ ¤F > 0
whenever sf < 1). It su±ces therefore to examine the terms in square brackets to deduce how
Foreign welfare varies with the level of the ¯xed cost subsidy.
To examine the scope for a welfare improvement from a small subsidy, set sf = 0 in (3.3).
Since
@¤Ff
@sf > 0 for sf < 1, a su±cient condition for
@WFf













But this last inequality holds because k
"¡1 > 1 > ¹. Thus,
@WFf
@sf > 0 in a neighborhood of
sf = 0. One can show moreover that
@WFf
@sf > 0 for all sf < 0 (when the policy is in fact a
tax on FDI), while WFf ! ¡1 as sf ! 1¡. (The details of these proofs are not particularly
illuminating, and are relegated to Appendix 7.1.)
14Welfare in Foreign therefore increases with sf for small values of the subsidy, but has at
least one turning point in the interval (0;1). There thus exists an optimal positive subsidy
level that maximizes welfare for the host country. In particular, a small ¯xed cost subsidy
unambiguously improves welfare for Foreign's workers.
It is useful at this point to understand what drives the scope for welfare improvement.
The presence of a ¯xed cost for investment prevents a segment of Home ¯rms from servicing
the Foreign market directly through FDI. The subsidy thus helps to alleviate some of the
ine±ciency caused by this ¯xed cost barrier. As illustrated in Figure 1, the Home exporters
sitting just to the left of the productivity cut-o®, a
1¡"
I , switch to servicing the Foreign market
via FDI as a result of the subsidy. For the consumption gains to Foreign from this switch
to be large enough to outweigh the direct costs of the subsidy, it must intuitively be the
case that these Home ¯rms drawn into FDI need to be su±ciently productive. (The more
productive a ¯rm is, the lower the unit price of its output, and hence the larger the increase in
volume of consumption when the price of this good falls from
¿awH
® (under exporting) to
awF
®
(under FDI).) The distribution of ¯rm productivities must therefore be relatively thick-tailed,
in order to ensure that the FDI subsidy indeed attracts a margin of su±ciently productive
¯rms. This is why the proof above requires that k be su±ciently large in the inequality (3.4)
in order to sign the slope of the welfare function at sf = 0, which is precisely the role that
¯rm heterogeneity plays in generating this selection e®ect. Reassuringly, the extent of ¯rm
heterogeneity required for the result to hold is also empirically relevant, consistent with the
earlier estimates showing that k ¡ " + 1 > 0 from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).15
It is also worth emphasizing that the welfare improvement in this result arises simply from
consumption gains to the host economy, putting aside other considerations that have been
highlighted in the literature as potential sources of gains from attracting FDI. Such e®ects as
technological spillovers (Fumagalli 2003, Javorcik 2004), agglomeration economies (Haaland
and Wooten 1999), and an increase in the demand for Foreign labor would intuitively reinforce
and amplify the welfare improvement from a subsidy to FDI (so long as wages do not rise too
much to undermine MNCs' incentives to undertake production in the Foreign country).
A natural question to ask at this point is whether the optimal ¯xed cost subsidy is unique.
15This optimal subsidy discussion puts aside normative issues with regards to whether the subsidy can
indeed be implemented. A more thorough treatment of the determinants of FDI subsidy levels would almost
certainly need to incorporate political economy considerations. See for example Janeba (2004) in which FDI
subsidies generate a re-distributive e®ect from workers to ¯rms, which inherently limits the scope for large
subsidies if workers have su±cient political clout.
15Note ¯rst that there does not exist a closed-form expression for s¤
f. Moreover, the welfare
function is not globally concave, and there are parameter values, albeit extreme ones, for
which WFf exhibits more than one turning point in the interval (0;1).16 For all practical
purposes though, the calibration exercise in Section 3.5 will con¯rm that for the empirically
relevant values of the parameter space, the welfare function does exhibit a unique turning
point. For those that desire a more formal treatment of this issue, Appendix 7.1 derives a
su±cient condition for the uniqueness of the optimal subsidy: 2(" ¡ 1) > k. This restriction
is typically satis¯ed by the parameter choices of similar calibrations in the literature, in
particular Ghironi and Melitz (2005) where the baseline values are k = 3:4 and " = 3:8.
3.2 FDI subsidy to variable costs
What happens if the ¯nancial incentives to Home multinationals are targeted towards their
variable costs of production instead? Many of the incentive schemes o®ered in practice, such
as job-creation subsidies or corporate tax rate cuts, fall into this category. The analysis in
this subsection shows that in the baseline two-country model, the welfare implications of a
variable cost subsidy turn out to be qualitatively identical to what we have seen for a ¯xed
cost subsidy.
Consider then a subsidy to the variable costs of Home MNCs' production in Foreign that
reduces their e®ective unit wage costs from wF to (1 ¡ sv)wF, where sv < 1. As before,
suppose that the state pays for these subsidies by raising an income tax on its citizens, tv. If








where the right-hand side of (3.5) is the total amount paid out as production subsidies to
the multinationals. Note that a higher demand for Home ¯nal goods, AF, will raise the total
subsidy bill directly under a variable cost subsidy scheme.
We now have a parallel result concerning the welfare improvements from a subsidy to
MNCs' variable costs of production:
Proposition 2 [Variable Cost Subsidy]: Consider the family of variable cost FDI sub-
sidies characterized by sv that satisfy the balanced-budget constraint (3.5). Then the opti-
16Some experimentation with the calibration parameters in Section 3.5 shows that when both k is increased
(to say k = 50) and ¹ is raised closer to the value of ® (to say ¹ = 0:6), then WFf actually has 3 turning
points in (0;1).
16mal policy, s¤
v, that maximizes welfare in Foreign is a strictly positive subsidy level, namely
s¤
v 2 (0;1).
Proof: Once again, it su±ces to examine the behavior of the terms WFv ´ (1 ¡ tv)wF +
1¡¹
¹ (XF)¹ in the indirect utility function. The state's budget constraint (3.5) allows us to
re-write tv in terms of sv; making this substitution and using the expression for (XF)¹ from
(2.18), one obtains after some simpli¯cation:




















where ¤Fv and ~ ¤Fv are given by ¤F and ~ ¤F respectively except with (wF)1¡" replaced by
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(3.7)
With this formulation, the welfare function to be maximized in (3.6) is completely analo-
gous to that from the ¯xed cost subsidy case in (3.2). It is straightforward to check that the
proof that
@WFv
@sv > 0 at sv = 0 follows the same steps in Proposition 1 with the relevant terms
involving ¤Ff now replaced by terms in ¤Fv. We will once again require that the distribution
of ¯rm productivities be su±ciently thick-tailed (with k large enough to satisfy the condition
(3.4)) in order to sign this derivative in a neighborhood of sv = 0. In addition, one can show
that
@WFv
@sv > 0 for all sv < 0, while WFv ! ¡1 when sv approaches 1 (see Appendix 7.2).
In short, the welfare function in the variable cost subsidy case has a positive slope at
sv = 0, a turning point in the interior of (0;1) and an asymptote to ¡1 at sv ! 1¡. The
optimal policy is therefore a strictly positive subsidy level, s¤
v 2 (0;1). Once again, while the
equation
@WFv
@sv = 0 may in principle have more than one zero in (0;1), the optimal subsidy is
nevertheless unique for the range of parameters that is empirically relevant.
As with a ¯xed cost subsidy, the variable cost subsidy exhibits the same selection e®ect
of drawing in the most productive Home exporters who were just shy of the a
1¡"
I cut-o® for
FDI. There is however also a production e®ect at play here, in that the variable cost subsidy
raises output levels at all Foreign assembly plants, even those belonging to MNCs that would
have conducted FDI without the subsidy. This additional e®ect raises further the consumption
gains from a variable cost subsidy. Put otherwise, the variable cost subsidy helps to counteract
17the ine±ciency stemming from the ¯rms' monopoly pricing power, by reducing the e®ective
mark-up of MNCs from 1
® to 1¡sv
® .
Section 3.5 shall turn to a more careful comparison of the relative e±cacy of ¯xed versus
variable cost subsidies. But ¯rst, it is useful to isolate the key role played by ¯rm heterogeneity
for the welfare results, by explicitly contrasting what happens with the use of FDI subsidies
when all Home ¯rms have identical productivity levels.
3.3 Comparison with a model with homogenous ¯rms
Consider now the case where all ¯rms in Home's di®erentiated goods sector share the same
unit labor input coe±cient, ¹ a, as in Krugman (1980). Within the framework set up in Section
2, this corresponds to a situation where GH(a) has its entire density concentrated at a single
point. For simplicity, I shall continue to treat N as exogenous.
Suppose to begin with that all the Home ¯rms initially service Foreign via exports instead
of via FDI, namely ¹ a satis¯es ¼D(¹ a);¼X(¹ a) > 0, but ¼X(¹ a) < ¼I(¹ a), where the pro¯t functions
come from (2:6), (2:7) and (2:8). The question of interest would then be whether a subsidy
to the Home ¯rms inducing a switch from exporting to FDI improves welfare in Foreign. It
turns out that in this setting, the scope for welfare improvements from a subsidy to FDI is
not guaranteed when ¯rms have identical productivity levels.
For the purpose of illustration, let us focus on the case of a ¯xed cost subsidy. Consider a
subsidy, sf, that would make the Home ¯rms indi®erent between exporting and FDI as their
preferred mode of servicing the Foreign market. This is the smallest subsidy level that would










= (1 ¡ sf)(fI ¡ fX)wH (3.8)
where AF;X and AF;I are respectively the levels of Foreign market demand in the old equilib-
rium where all Home ¯rms export and in the new equilibrium where all Home ¯rms conduct
FDI. Now, the de¯nition of Xc




i(¹ a). The demand for indi-
vidual products, xc













¢¡" when Home ¯rms conduct FDI. A quick substitution back into (2.2)























1¡¹, where the X and I
subscripts refer to whether Home's sales to Foreign are conducted via exporting or FDI.




As before, let the ¯xed cost subsidy be paid for by revenues from a tax, tf, on citizens:
tfwFMF = sf(fI ¡ fX)wHN (3.9)
Recall that the relevant welfare measure is: (1 ¡ tf)wF +
1¡¹
¹ (XF)¹. The minimum e®ective
FDI subsidy level given by (3.8) can be substituted into the balanced-budget constraint (3.9)
to obtain an expression for tf. One can now derive an expression for the change in welfare for


























The second summand in (3.10) is positive given the parameter assumptions ¹;® < 1 and
wF < ¿wH. This term represents the consumption gains to Foreign from a lower price of
Home ¯nal goods. Thus, for the net change to Foreign welfare to be positive, one needs the
¯rst term in (3.10) to be su±ciently small. In particular, the higher the ¯xed cost of FDI (the
larger is (fI ¡ fX)), the higher the total subsidy bill required to attract multinationals, and
this potentially overwhelms the consumption gains from this policy action. (Note that the
condition ¼X(¹ a) < ¼I(¹ a) delivers a positive lower bound on the magnitude of (fI ¡ fX), and
not an upper bound, as would be needed to limit the size of the subsidy bill represented by
the term ¡
(fI¡fX)wHN
MF . Thus, the set-up of our model does not constrain how large fI ¡ fX
can be.)
This simple exercise highlights the key role played by ¯rm heterogeneity and the selection
e®ect for the results of Sections 3.1 and 3.2. When ¯rms are instead homogenous with respect
to their productivity levels, any subsidy that is e®ective in attracting a given Home multina-
tional necessarily also induces the full measure of Home exporters to switch to FDI. This can
imply a large subsidy burden if the ¯xed cost of conducting FDI is very high. In essence then,
the industry equilibrium with heterogenous ¯rms moderates the amount of FDI induced by
the subsidy by sieving out the most productive Home exporters, a selection mechanism that
is critical for delivering a welfare improvement.
3.4 N endogenous
Up till now, the measure of Home ¯rms, N, has been treated as exogenous in order to highlight
the shifting of the FDI cut-o®, a
1¡"
I , that an FDI subsidy induces. However, when the host
19country is a large market for Home, this policy action by Foreign also increases the ex ante
pro¯tability of potential entrant ¯rms to the Home di®erentiated goods sector. I show brie°y
in this subsection how to incorporate this additional entry e®ect by endogenizing N in the
full industry equilibrium. The model remains highly tractable, with the subsequent increase
in the measure of Home ¯rms reinforcing the gains that accrue to Foreign consumers.
Free-entry: N is pinned down by a free-entry condition for the Home sector, which closes
the industry equilibrium in Section 2. Potential entrants do not observe their productivity
draw 1=a until after they have started paying a per-period ¯xed cost of entry, fE, expressed
in units of labor. These ¯rms therefore weigh their expected pro¯ts after entry against this
¯xed cost, with zero ex ante pro¯ts prevailing in equilibrium. This free-entry condition for
the Home sector is:
fEwH = (1 ¡ ®)AH
¡wH
®
¢1¡" VH(aD) + (1 ¡ ®)AF
¡¿wH
®
¢1¡" (VH(aX) ¡ VH(aI)):::
::: + (1 ¡ ®)AF
¡wF
®
¢1¡" VH(aI) ¡ fDwHGH(aD):::
::: ¡ fXwH(GH(aX) ¡ GH(aI)) ¡ fIwHGH(aI)
(3.11)
By substituting the productivity cut-o®s in (2.9)-(2.11) and the distributions in (2.12)-(2.13)






This last equation has an intuitive interpretation: ¤H(AH)
k
"¡1 captures the normalized pro¯ts
from sales in Home weighted by a measure of the level of demand in the Home market (similarly
for ¤F(AF)
k
"¡1). The free-entry condition (3.12) thus equates the ¯xed cost of entry with the
total expected pro¯ts for the ¯rm from both markets.17













; i = H;F (3.13)
The free-entry condition (3.12) and the two equations in (3.13) comprise a system of three
equations in three unknowns, N, AH and AF, that can be solved for the equilibrium in the
Home sector. Speci¯cally, substituting from (3.13) into (3.12) and re-arranging delivers the
17The key advantage of equation (3.12) is that we can collect the terms involving AH and AF to get a linear
equation linking (AH)k=("¡1) and (AF)k=("¡1). This would not be possible if one attempted to reduce the
number of model parameters by setting fD, fX or fI to 0.




























Since ¹ < ®, (3.14) implies that the measure of varieties decreases when ¯xed entry costs, fE,
or Home wages, wH, increase. This expression for N can then be used in (2.18) to evaluate
the CES consumption aggregate (XF)¹ used in computing Foreign welfare levels. It is easy to
observe that both N and (XF)¹ exhibit similar comparative statics with respect to most of
the structural parameters of the model; in particular, both variables rise as the market size,
Mi, or normalized pro¯t levels, ¤i, of either country increase.
Allowing N to be endogenous introduces an additional varieties e®ect from the use of
an FDI subsidy. Denoting NFf (respectively NFv) to be the measure of Home ¯rms in the





@sv > 0 for all sf;sv < 1.
Intuitively, the subsidy to FDI tends to raise the pro¯tability of potential Home entrants.
In equilibrium, the thickness of the supply side of this sector has to increase in response to
ensure that ¯rms continue to earn zero ex ante pro¯ts. Due to the \love of varieties" exhibited
by the utility function, this increase in N ampli¯es the consumption gains arising from the
use of a subsidy. For the net e®ect on Foreign welfare, one must weigh this against the higher
subsidy bill to be paid to the large mass of Home ¯rms. It turns out nevertheless that when
N is endogenous, the welfare functions WFf or WFv continue to inherit the same shape as in
the baseline case where N is ¯xed: Welfare is an increasing function of sf (or sv) when the
subsidy level is negative; exhibits a positive slope when the subsidy level is zero; but hits a
negative asymptote as the subsidy level approaches 1. I summarize this result in the following
proposition (see Appendix 7.3 for a sketch of the proof):
Proposition 3 [N endogenous]: For either ¯xed or variable cost subsidy schemes, the op-
timal subsidy policy that maximizes welfare in Foreign when N is endogenous continues to be
a strictly positive subsidy level that lies in the interior of the interval (0;1).
In sum, the varieties e®ect introduced when N is endogenous is an additional e®ect that
does not alter the welfare implications from a subsidy to FDI. In fact, Appendix 7.3 shows that
21the slope of the welfare function when the subsidy level is 0 is larger when N is endogenous
compared to the baseline case where N is ¯xed (for both the ¯xed and variable cost cases).
Thus, for small subsidy levels, the increase induced in the measure of Home ¯rms ampli¯es
the welfare gains accruing to Foreign. Note also that since Home consumers also bene¯t from
the expansion of varieties, the FDI subsidy in fact generates a Pareto improvement for both
countries.
3.5 Fixed versus Variable Cost Subsidies
As a ¯nal exercise for this two-country baseline model, I compare the impact and e±cacy of
the two types of subsidy schemes considered. In particular, how does the welfare level at the
optimal ¯xed cost subsidy, s¤
f, compare to that at the optimal variable cost subsidy, s¤
v?
The answer to this question is best illustrated graphically. Figure 2 plots the welfare
functions WFf and WFv from a simple calibration of the model. Based on Ghironi and Melitz
(2005), I set the elasticity of consumer demand to " = 3:8 (which implies ® = 0:74), and the
key heterogeneity parameter to k = 3:4.18 (The qualitative nature of Figure 2 is unchanged if
the higher value of " = 6 more commonly seen in the macro literature is used instead to imply a
smaller price mark-up.) Following their lead, I also ¯x fX = 0:23, fE = 1, and ¿ = 1:3. There
is less precedent in the empirical literature for the remaining model parameters, although
the conditions ¹ < ®, ¿wH > wF, and aD > aX > aI impose some discipline on the values
that can be chosen. While the baseline calibration in Figure 2 adopts the values: ¹ = 0:3,
fD = 0:1, fI = 2, wH = wF = 1, aH = 1, and MH = MF = 1, the general shape of the
welfare functions is nevertheless robust to alternative calibrations that continue to respect
the structural assumptions of the model, including the ordering of the respective productivity
cut-o®s.
Several observations emerge from Figure 2. First, the shape of the welfare functions
con¯rms the existence of a unique optimal subsidy for this parametrization, both in the ¯xed
and variable cost cases.19 Second, the variable cost subsidy appears to generate much higher
levels of welfare than the ¯xed cost subsidy for subsidy rates in the interval (0;1). This
con¯rms the earlier intuition articulated in Section 3.2 that a variable cost subsidy has the
potential to generate a greater kick to welfare by reducing the distortion arising from ¯rms'
18Ghironi and Melitz (2005) adopt the value " = 3:8 from the empirical estimation of Bernard et al. (2003)
based on US plant and trade data. Bernard et al. (2003) also estimate the log standard deviation of plant
sales to be 1:67; since this moment is equal to 1=(k ¡ " + 1) in our model, this implies a value of k = 3:4.
19This is not surprising for the case of the ¯xed cost subsidy: As noted before, the calibration parameters
satisfy the su±cient condition 2(" ¡ 1) > k for a unique turning point.
22monopoly pricing power: The e®ective mark-ups that consumers pay is lowered, while output
at each ¯rm is raised from their ine±ciently low levels. The resulting increase in equilibrium
consumption potentially generates greater utility gains for Foreign workers. This production
e®ect is absent with a ¯xed cost subsidy, which only a®ects a Home ¯rms' decision on exporting
versus FDI, but not its output levels. Third, allowing the measure of ¯rms N to respond to the
introduction of the subsidy accentuates the welfare functions without altering their general
shape, as was asserted in Proposition 3. For the small to moderate positive subsidy levels
graphed in Figure 2, the case with endogenous N (dotted-line graphs) has welfare levels raised
above that when the measure of Home ¯rms is ¯xed (solid-line graphs).20
Figure 2 suggests that there is a prima facie case in favor of variable cost subsidies, such
as a reduction in the corporate tax rate or job-creation grants, from the perspective of Foreign
welfare levels. We can in fact state the following result for the case where N is exogenous (see
Appendix 7.4 for a proof):
Proposition 4 [Fixed versus variable cost subsidy]: Suppose that " > 2 and that the
measure of Home ¯rms is ¯xed. Then, a variable cost subsidy that incurs the same total
subsidy bill as a ¯xed cost subsidy always delivers greater consumption gains to Foreign.
In words, a variable cost subsidy has more bang for the buck, delivering a greater increase
in utility from consumption than a corresponding ¯xed cost subsidy that incurs the same
amount of public spending. It follows immediately that the welfare level achieved by the
optimal variable cost subsidy, s¤
v, is higher than that reached by the optimal ¯xed cost subsidy,
s¤
f. The requirement that " > 2 also has an intuitive interpretation: Consumer demand
needs to be su±ciently elastic, so that a given price decrease will generate a large increase in
consumption.21
It is important though to identify a key caveat that will qualify the above result putting
variable cost subsidies in a more favorable light. As it stands, the only motive in the model
for a Home ¯rm to open a plant in Foreign is to take advantage of the proximity-concentration
tradeo® in servicing the Foreign market, so that FDI is of a purely horizontal nature. However,
much of the foreign a±liate activity that takes place in the real world is intended to service
more than just the local market, with some output from the foreign assembly plant being
20For the exogenous N graphs, the value of N used is given by (3.14) with the subsidy level set to 0.
21The proof of this proposition in Appendix 7.4 makes it evident that this lower bound " can be made
tighter if one is willing to take a position on the value of k. A more precise lower bound is " > 2k+1
k+1 , which
clearly implies " > 2.
23shipped back to the home or third-country markets. It turns out that the scope for welfare
improvement from a variable cost subsidy to production is potentially fragile to incorporating
such a re-exporting motive, since re-exports represent subsidized output for which the con-
sumption gains accrue purely to foreigners. If the third-country market that the a±liate is
servicing is large, re-exports would raise the total subsidy bill signi¯cantly without generat-
ing corresponding gains to domestic consumers, potentially negating the scope for a welfare
improvement (the slope of the welfare function at sv = 0 could even be negative).22 To avoid
this outcome, it would thus be important for the subsidy to be administered as a domestic
sales or retail credit, instead of as a rebate to production. Note that a ¯xed cost subsidy, on
the other hand, is robust to this criticism, since it alters only ¯rms' mode of servicing the
Foreign market, but does not a®ect ¯rms' choice of output levels.
4 Some extensions
I discuss brie°y now two extensions that illustrate the usefulness of the baseline framework,
as well as the robustness of the welfare results on the e®ects of FDI subsidies.
4.1 Import subsidies
The model presented above lends itself naturally to an analysis of trade policy. It is well-
established that the optimal policy for a country with a downward-sloping demand curve is
to levy a positive import tari®, since the gains in tari® revenue outstrip the loss in consumer
surplus when the tari® is small (see Helpman and Krugman (1989)). In view of this result, pre-
vious arguments advanced in favor of import subsidies have relied on the existence of dynamic
gains: Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988) for example posit that when learning-by-doing e®ects are
large, it may be optimal to subsidize imports to promote learning by foreign producers, thus
lowering prices in the long-run.
The framework with heterogenous ¯rms suggests one additional mechanism through which
import subsidies might be bene¯cial, by increasing the variety of goods that is exported to the
Foreign market. In this case, however, the intuition is a little less neat: A subsidy extended
by Foreign to exporters will induce some Home ¯rms to start exporting to Foreign, delivering
a positive varieties e®ect, but it will also prompt some Home MNCs to switch from horizontal
22This can be shown more formally using a three country set-up, by introducing an additional cut-o® in
the industry equilibrium, aIX, such that Home ¯rms with a < aIX will ¯nd it more pro¯table to service the
third-country market via this re-exporting option than by direct exports from Home.
24FDI back to exporting, raising prices for Foreign consumers for this margin of goods. There
is thus a positive selection e®ect from the leftward shift of the a
1¡"
X cut-o® in Figure 1, but a
detrimental e®ect as the a
1¡"
I cut-o® moves to the right. A priori at least, it is not clear if the
net e®ect will be a positive welfare gain accruing to Foreign.
It is nevertheless straightforward to compute the welfare impact of either a ¯xed or variable
cost subsidy to impacts, following the methodology in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. It turns out that
for this alternative policy intervention, a small subsidy is indeed welfare-improving and we
have the following parallel result:
Proposition 5 [Import Subsidies]: Consider the family of ¯xed cost (respectively variable
cost) import subsidies that satisfy a balanced-budget constraint. Then the optimal policy that
maximizes welfare in Foreign is a strictly positive subsidy level.
The proof of this proposition when N is exogenous is essentially identical to that for
Propositions 1 and 2, hinging on the fact that the welfare function has a positive slope in the
neighborhood where the subsidy level is zero. (See Appendix 7.5 for details.) Once again,
the result relies on inequality (3.4) holding ( k
"¡1 > ¹, or equivalently that the distribution
GH(a) is su±ciently thick-tailed), so that the ¯rms newly drawn into exporting to Foreign
are su±ciently productive ¯rms. When N is allowed to be endogenous, the entry of more
¯rms in the Home di®erentiated sector generates a positive varieties e®ect that reinforces the
welfare gains from a small subsidy, akin to Proposition 3. Therefore, it turns out that the
consumption gains from drawing in more ¯rms at the a
1¡"
X cut-o® outweigh the loss of MNCs
at the a
1¡"
I margin. Intuitively, this is because there is a greater density of ¯rms at the cut-o®
for exporting than at the cut-o® for FDI.
4.2 Income e®ects
To this point, the quasilinear utility function (2.1) has been convenient for the analysis be-
cause the income e®ect from the imposition of a tax on labor income a®ects only the level of
consumption of the homogenous good. If however demand for di®erentiated goods is also sub-
ject to income e®ects, then this decrease in disposable income could dampen the consumption
gains from an FDI subsidy.
To examine the robustness of the welfare results to incorporating such income e®ects, I
consider the other standard utility speci¯cation used in the literature in such models of het-
erogenous ¯rms, in which utility is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over consumption of homogenous
25and di®erentiated goods. For country i, this utility function is given by:
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Here, ´c 2 (0;1) is the share of income spent on country c's di®erentiated goods sector; I
assume that 1 ¡ ´H ¡ ´F > 0, so that the income share spent on the outside good is positive.
With this choice of utility function, a labor tax on Foreign workers will lower the level of
demand in that market for di®erentiated products, but consumers can potentially compensate
for this by substituting towards homogenous goods.
It turns out that even with this alternative utility function, the optimal policy for Foreign
continues to be a small subsidy to multinationals, namely that the consumption gains from
attracting more FDI outweigh the direct costs of funding the policy:
Proposition 6 [Income e®ects]: The welfare results pertaining to the impact of ¯xed cost
and variable cost subsidies in Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold with the Cobb-Douglas
utility function in (4.1). In particular, the optimal policy that maximizes welfare in Foreign
is a strictly positive subsidy level in the interior of (0;1).
The proof of this proposition for the case of a ¯xed cost subsidy is sketched out in Appendix
7.6. It is therefore reassuring that the main welfare implications of FDI subsidies carry
through even when the demand for di®erentiated goods is subject to income e®ects with a
Cobb-Douglas utility function.
5 Conclusion
There has been much recent work in international trade on models of ¯rm heterogeneity
aimed at understanding the interaction between global forces and industry structure. This
paper builds upon this work by extending it to a policy analysis of FDI subsidies, which have
been used with increasing frequency by countries that perceive potential economic gains from
attracting multinationals to their shores.
To this end, this paper has developed a two-country version of the Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2004) model that admits a tractable closed-form expression for consumer welfare
in each country, a crucial prerequisite for a positive welfare analysis of subsidies to FDI.
Although the framework in Section 2 admittedly focuses only on the consumption gains to
attracting horizontal FDI (from the lowered prices of MNCs' products in the host country), it
26nevertheless delivers a sharp benchmark result, namely that an FDI subsidy to either MNCs'
¯xed or variable costs of operation leads unambiguously to a rise in consumer welfare in the
host country, after netting out the cost of ¯nancing this policy through a tax on workers'
income. Of note, this result does not require us to appeal to other potential bene¯ts of FDI,
such as technological spillovers or agglomeration economies, that have received a fair amount
of attention in the related policy debates.
This scope for a welfare improvement from subsidizing FDI is driven by a selection e®ect,
highlighting the key role played by ¯rm heterogeneity in these theoretical results. The FDI
subsidy enables the host country to attract the most productive Home country exporters
to switch to servicing the Foreign market via FDI. Intuitively, this result requires that the
distribution of ¯rm productivities be su±ciently thick-tailed, so that the margin of ¯rms drawn
in consists of su±ciently productive ¯rms. What is particularly nice is that the analytic
condition on the heterogeneity parameter of ¯rm productivities is one that prior empirical
research (by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)) has shown is satis¯ed in practice from
observed industry distributions. From a quantitative point of view, the model also suggests
that a variable cost subsidy generates much greater gains to the host country than a ¯xed
cost subsidy, given that a reduction in MNCs' variable costs of operation has an additional
production e®ect that helps to partially correct the ine±ciently low output levels stemming
from individual ¯rms' monopoly pricing power.
The framework developed in this paper lends itself readily to future work. The most
natural extension to be explored is how to apply the set-up to an analysis of FDI competition
among two prospective host countries, seeking to draw in multinationals from the Home
country. My preliminary work on this topic has shown that it is relatively easy to derive a
closed-form expression for welfare in each host country in a symmetric equilibrium in which
both countries o®er the same subsidy level and attract precisely half the measure N of Home
MNCs to start an a±liate within their respective borders. However, it is not possible to
get similarly neat closed-forms when the country subsidy o®ers di®er and the corresponding
industry equilibrium is asymmetric. A more rigorous analysis of this problem will therefore
likely require the use of computational methods to understand the shape of each country's
reactions function in response to the other country's choice of subsidy level. An analysis
along these lines to understand the properties of the competitive subsidy equilibrium is on
my research plans for the near future.
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297 Appendix
7.1 Details of Proof of Proposition 1
Proof that WFf ! ¡1 when sf ! 1¡: Recall from (3.2) that:





















Now, from the de¯nition of ¤F in (2.17):
¤Ff =
" ¡ 1





















which implies that limsf!1¡ ¤Ff = +1, since 1¡" < 0. It follows that limsf!1¡ ~ ¤Ff = +1,
since ~ ¤Ff is ¤Ff raised to a positive power (
¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®) > 0 as ¹ < ®).

























Clearly, limsf!1¡ g(sf) = 1, which implies that limsf!1¡ 1
¤Ff
@¤Ff
@sf = +1. Hence, the limit of
the term in the square brackets in (7.1) as sf approaches 1 is ¡1. Together with the fact
that limsf!1¡ ~ ¤Ff = +1, we have that WFf ! ¡1 when sf ! 1¡ as claimed.
Proof that
@WF
@sf > 0 for all sf < 0: With some algebraic manipulation, one can re-write


















k(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹®
















The ¯rst summand on the right-hand side is positive, since k(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹® > 0 follows from
k
"¡1 > ¹. Now observe that for sf < 0, the last two summands are:
sf
k(® ¡ ¹)
















(k ¡ " + 1)(® ¡ ¹)









(k ¡ " + 1)(® ¡ ¹)








(® ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ") ¡ ¹®
¹® ¡ k(¹ ¡ ®)
> 0 (7.3)
30where we have relied on the fact that ¹ < ® and " > 1.
Hence, the expression in the square brackets in (7.2) is positive, from which it follows that
@WFf
@sf > 0 whenever sf < 0.
Proof that 2(" ¡ 1) > k is a su±cient condition for WFf to have a unique turning
point: Setting the derivative in (7.2) equal to zero, we have that any turning point of the
welfare function must satisfy:
~ g(sf) ´
k(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹®







(k ¡ " + 1)(® ¡ ¹)






sf is a decreasing function of sf, while g(sf) is increasing in sf, so
it is not possible to conclude in general that ~ g(sf) is a monotonic function. Nevertheless,






< 0. For ~ g(sf) to have a
unique zero in (0;1), it su±ces that ~ g(sf) be a strictly convex function in this interval. It is
easy to check that
1¡sf
sf is indeed strictly convex. Since the sum of two convex functions is
















Since g(sf) 2 (0;1) for sf 2 (0;1), we have strict convexity if and only if g(sf) < k
2(k¡"+1). A
su±cient condition is therefore: 1 < k
2(k¡"+1), or equivalently 2(" ¡ 1) > k.
7.2 Details of Proof of Proposition 2
Proof that WFv ! ¡1 when sv ! 1¡: Recall from (3.6) that:













































Analogous to the proof in Appendix 7.1, we have limsv!1¡ ¤Fv = limsf!1¡ ~ ¤Ff = +1.



































gether, these imply that limsv!1¡ 1
¤Fv
@¤Fv
@sv = +1. The limit of the term in the square brackets
in (7.5) as sv ! 1¡ is therefore ¡1, so that we have limsv!1¡ WFf = ¡1 as desired.
Proof that
@WFv
@sv > 0 for all sv < 0: With some algebraic manipulation, one can re-write


















k(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ¹®
¹® ¡ k(¹ ¡ ®)
+ sv
k(® ¡ ¹)









(k + 1)((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ "(¿wH)1¡"
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡"
¸
(7.6)
Since we know that
k(1¡®)¡¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®) > 0, it su±ces to show that the last two summands on the





((1¡sv)wF)1¡"¡(¿wH)1¡". Using this inequality to replace fX in the denominator
of h(sv) and simplifying, one obtains: h(sv) <
((1¡sv)wF)1¡"¡(¿wH)1¡"
((1¡sv)wF)1¡" . For sv < 0, we then have:
sv
k(® ¡ ¹)








(k + 1)((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ "(¿wH)1¡"






¹® ¡ k(¹ ¡ ®)
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡"
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡"h(sv) ¡
(k + 1)((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ "(¿wH)1¡"







¹® ¡ k(¹ ¡ ®)
¡
(k + 1)((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ "(¿wH)1¡"
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡"
¸
For this last expression to be positive whenever sv < 0, it su±ces to show that:
(k + 1)((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ "(¿wH)1¡"
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡" > k (7.7)
since
k2(®¡¹)
¹®¡k(¹¡®) ¡ k =
¡k¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®) < 0. This is su±cient to ensure that the expression in the
square brackets in (7.6) is positive, so that
@WFv
@sv > 0 whenever sv < 0.
Bearing in mind that ((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡" > 0, a re-arrangement of (7.7) yields:
((1 ¡ sv)wF)
1¡" ¡ (¿wH)
1¡" + (k ¡ " + 1)(¿wH)
1¡" > 0
which clearly holds, since k ¡ " + 1 > 0.
327.3 Proofs from Section 3.4 (N endogenous)






~ MF ~ ¤Ff






for all sf < 1. An analogous expression holds for
@NFv
@sv with sf replaced by sv and the subscript
sf replaced by sv.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 3: I illustrate this proof for the case of a ¯xed cost subsidy,
since the argument for the case of a variable cost subsidy is virtually identical. Using the ex-













is a positive increasing function of sf when sf < 0. Since NFf is also a positive increasing
function of sf for all sf < 1, this implies that WFf must be increasing in sf when sf is
negative.














when sf approaches 1, this implies that limsf!1¡ WFf = ¡1.
Finally, the expression for
@WFf
@sf when N is endogenous is given by (7.2) plus an extra term
























This term is clearly positive when evaluated at sf = 0, and hence the slope of WFf at sf = 0
is larger when N is endogenous when compared to the baseline case when N is ¯xed.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: The proof proceeds via contradiction. Suppose that the total subsidy bills from sf and




















((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡"h(sv) (7.8)
However, suppose to the contrary that the consumption gains from the ¯xed cost subsidy
are larger; pulling out the relevant terms from the welfare functions, this means that ~ ¤Ff ¸
~ ¤Fv. From the de¯nition in (2.17), this assumption simpli¯es to:














33Observe though that (7.9) implies that g(sf) ¸ h(sv), and hence that ~ ¤Ffg(sf) ¸ ~ ¤Fvh(sv).
Looking back at (7.8), we must therefore have:
sf
1 ¡ sf






((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡" (7.10)
















Combining (7.10) and (7.11), and eliminating
sf
1¡sf, the following inequality needs to be
satis¯ed:
·








k ¡ " + 1
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡"
((1 ¡ sv)wF)1¡" ¡ (¿wH)1¡" < 0 (7.12)
Let us de¯ne the function in sv on the left-hand side of this last inequality as Ã(sv).
Observe that Ã(0) = 0. I shall now show that if " > 2, then Ã0(sv) > 0 for all sv 2 (0;1), so
that in fact Ã(sv) > 0 for all positive subsidy levels. This will yield the desired contradiction
to (7.12). Some algebra shows that Ã0(sv) is equal up to a positive multiplicative constant to:
·



































Since (1¡sv) 2 (0;1), this last expression is positive if and only if:
k(1¡")
k¡"+1 +1 < 0. This holds
when " > 2k+1
k+1 , and in particular when " > 2.
7.5 Sketch of proof of Proposition 5
The proofs concerning the welfare implications of an import subsidy mirror closely those for
an FDI subsidy in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, as well as Appendix 7.1 and 7.2. The exposition below
is therefore brief, showing once again that the welfare function under an import subsidy has
a positive slope when the subsidy level is less than or equal to zero, but asymptotes towards
34¡1 as the subsidy level tends towards its maximum value. The optimal policy is therefore a
subsidy level that is strictly positive.
Fixed cost subsidy to Home exporters: Consider ¯rst a subsidy that reduces the ¯xed
cost of exporting for each Home ¯rm by the amount sffXwH, with sf < 1. Suppose as before
that this is ¯nanced by a tax on labor income equal to tfwH. The relevant balanced budget




Substituting the implied value of tf from (7.13) into the de¯nition of WFf = (1 ¡ tf)wF +
1¡¹
¹ (XF)¹, one obtains the following expression after some work for welfare in Foreign:





































































and ~ ©Ff = (©Ff)
¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®). Note that ©Ff is precisely equal to ¤F with fX replaced by
(1¡sf)fX. (The switch of notation to © is intended to avoid a clash with ¤, which has been
used for the analysis of FDI subsidies.) The welfare function in (7.14) clearly parallels that in
(7.1) for the case of a ¯xed cost subsidy to FDI, except that the ex ante pro¯ts from sales in
Foreign are now given by ©Ff. The expression for ©Ff also makes apparent the two opposing
e®ects that an import subsidy has: The ¯rst summand in the square brackets captures how
sf lowers the a
1¡"
X threshold for exporting, which tends to increase the consumption gains for
Foreign, but the second summand captures how sf raises the a
1¡"
I cut-o® for FDI, which acts
to lower these consumption gains instead.
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35Evaluating sf at 0, it is straightforward to check once again that
@WFf
@sf > 0, given that k
"¡1 > ¹.
Thus, a small subsidy to exporting ¯rms from Home raises indirect utility in Foreign.
Moreover, as sf ¡! 1¡, we have ©Ff; ~ ©Ff; 1
©Ff
@©Ff
@sf ¡! +1. This implies from (7.14)
that WFf asymptotes to ¡1 as sf tends towards its maximum value of 1.
Last but not least,
@©Ff



















1¡sf. Substituting these two inequalities
into the expression in square brackets in (7.15), one can then show that when sf < 0, we have
@WFf
@sf > 0.
Variable cost subsidy to Home exporters: I examine now a subsidy that reduces the






























































































and ~ ©Fv = (©Fv)
¹®
¹®¡k(¹¡®).
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36which parallels (7.18) closely with sf replaced by sv and ©Ff replaced by ©Fv. It follows
immediately that
@WFv
@sv > 0 at sv = 0 as before.




+1. Thus, Wsv ¡! ¡1 as sv approaches its maximum value of ¿.

















I . Together, these observations imply that
@WFv
@sv > 0
whenever sv < 0.
7.6 Sketch of proof of Proposition 6
Proof: I illustrate the robustness of the welfare results to the alternative utility speci¯cation
in (4.1) for the case of a subsidy to the ¯xed costs of FDI. The proof for a variable cost subsidy
is very similar. The derivations below follow closely that from Sections 2 and 3.1.
It is well-known that maximizing (4.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.3) delivers
the following individual demand functions for homogenous goods and di®erentiated products
respectively in Foreign: (x0





F (a)¡", where ACD
F is









Note that the superscript \CD" is used to refer to variables for the solution under this Cobb-
Douglas utility speci¯cation.
The industry equilibrium for the Home di®erentiated goods sector is identical to that in
the baseline model with quasilinear utility in Section 2. Therefore, following from (2.15), the


























Meanwhile, substituting for xH





























37We can now compute the indirect utility function by substituting the consumer demand
functions into (4.1). Making the relevant substitutions using (7.21) and (7.22), this is equal














Let us examine now a subsidy by Foreign that reduces the ¯xed cost of FDI for Home
¯rms by sffIwH. The balanced budget constraint (3.1) still applies. Substituting from (7.21)







@sf in Foreign. Replacing wF by (1 ¡ tf)wF in (7.23) and di®erentiating with




























































signfk(1 ¡ ´H ¡ ´F) + (" ¡ 1)(´H + ´F)g > 0. Hence, a small subsidy does indeed improve




@sf is an increasing function in sf which tends to +1 as sf tends to 1.
However, the maximum value that tf can take is 1, which implies a maximum feasible value




@sf ! 1. But as tf ! 1¡, W CD
F asymptotes towards ¡1.




























> 0 to ensure that the derivative in (7.24) is positive. But



























New FDI cut-off with subsidy 
















































































































Fixed cost subsidy (N exogenous)
Variable cost subsidy (N endogenous)
Fixed cost subsidy (N endogenous)




Figure 2: Some Sample Calibrated Welfare Functions 
 
 
Notes:  Calibration parameters are: k = 3.4, ε = 3.8 (which implies α = 0.74), μ = 0.3, fD = 0.1, fX = 0.23, fI 
= 2, wH = wF = 1, τ = 1.3, aH = 1, fE = 1, MH = MF = 1. These parameter choices imply the order of 
productivity cut-offs imposed in the model, namely aD > aX  > aI . For the cases where the measure of 
Home firms is exogenous, the value of N used is that obtained when setting the subsidy level to 0 in 
equation (3.14). 
 